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Introduction
This paper will study the so-called “console economies” created by game consoles. Game con-
soles are purpose-built sophisticated computers, which can only be used for playing video
games on a TV. Consoles are sold at a loss in order to be subsidized by revenues from video
game sales, a business model usually called the “razor and blades” model. By resolving the
technological and economical instability inherent in the PC game platform, game consoles
have now become the most dominant platform in the game industry. This stability attracts
game development, which then reinforces in a positive spiral the attractiveness of the console
leading to the creation of a console economy. Managing a successful console economy is con-
sequently a complex trade-off between several aspects and processes such as console devel-
opment, console production, marketing, console pricing, game sales, license fees, and game
development strategies. These issues will be elaborated in this paper. It will be argued that
game consoles are mainly part of the entertainment industry, and not only IT industry as be-
lieved by many  Schilling 2003 . As a way to understand this dynamic set of factors and their
interrelationship, a new metaphor will be proposed: the medieval marketplace. This meta-
phor better, compared to the “razor and blades” metaphor, highlights the complex techno-
logical/economic balance and the dependence on third-party game developers that create the
console economies.
This paper will begin with a section that contextualizes the game industry. Then follows a
chapter describing the characteristics of game consoles. In the section called console econo-
mies the specifics of these economies will be described. A life cycle analysis of game consoles
will be presented in order to illustrate the business strategies employed in the game console
industry, followed by a discussion and conclusions. Two in-depth cases of Sega and Xbox will
also be presented.
Game industry
The game industry is a young industry   what is considered to be the first computer game
ever, Spacewar  Kent 2001: 15 , was created in 1962 by a MIT student called Steve Russell. The
first commercial computer games were introduced during the 1970’s with arcade game hits
like Pong, Pac-Man and Space Invaders. During the 1970’s the first computer game devices for
the home, so-called game consoles, appeared on the market with the arrival of Magnavox Od-
yssey and Atari 2600. Several other game consoles were introduced until the market, and the
game industry as a whole, crashed in the beginning of the 1980’s due to an oversupply of me-
diocre games and the introduction of the personal computer. In 1985 the game industry re-
covered and made its global breakthrough when a Japanese company called Nintendo intro-
duced a game console called Famicom in Japan and NES  Nintendo Entertainment System  in
the rest of the world. Nintendo was long the undisputed ruler of the game industry, until Sega
effectively challenged its position in the beginning of the 1990’s. Since then many companiesThe Pink Machine Papers #16 N
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have tried to conquer the temporary market leader. Some  Sega, Sony  have succeeded, while
others  Sega, 3DO, Atari, Matsushita, Microsoft  have failed.
In the middle of the 1990’s computer games stopped being just a niche market and became a
vital part of the strategy for the electronics industry. Just in 1992, Nintendo earned, on its
console business, more than all the major US film studios, and more than Apple, IBM and
Microsoft  Scheff 1999: 5  Today the industry is growing with up to 20% annually  Dymek and
Rehn 2003  with a market size of around $20 billion which is expected to reach $30 billion by
2007  RocSearch 2004 .
The game industry enjoys pointing out that it challenges the film industry in terms of reve-
nues or growth  Darnuth 2001; Fahey 2004 . This claim is however slightly skewed since only
box office revenues are taken into account, while in reality video, DVD and TV revenues
make up the majority of the film industry’s revenues  Takahashi 2002b: 27 . At the same time
the game industry has substantial “spillover effects” as well with Pokèmon  originally a game 
as most prominent example   a game that has produced 4 movies, several TV series, one
comics magazine, branded lollypops and numerous other branded products. Regardless of
which industry really is the biggest, the game industry has in two decades achieved what al-
most took a century for the film industry to achieve.
Despite its huge success that has affected millions of people all over the world, the game in-
dustry has a secondary position to industries such as film, music, and IT. The industry is not
seen as serious or businesslike. Games are generally considered for children or at best childish
adults and thus not for serious people. Often people tend to associate games with colourful
Mario, blood-spattered Doom or some tedious fantasy monster   in other words something for
children. Games are seldom associated with art or seen as a new form of expression on the
same level as film, music or theatre.
The source to most of these opinions is related to the fact that games are associated with en-
tertainment, frivolity and vanity   the total opposite to hard and serious work. Games are
entertainment and entertainment is associated with leisure and relaxation, not with the daily
work. Games are simply put not treated seriously. Children quickly embraced games. Nin-
tendo, who targeted children, quickly became the brightest star of the industry. Unfortu-
nately this only made things worse as it reinforced the opinion that games are not serious   as
well as labelling them as childish. Nintendo is now, almost two decades later, one of the game
industry’s oldest and most experienced players, a company that even people who never play
games recognize. Equally famous is the old image of the game industry created by Nintendo 
childish and frivolous. However, over the last years the game industry has changed drastically.
The game market doesn’t consist only of children anymore, but mainly youths and young
adults. Sales and revenues have reached gigantic proportions compared to its humble begin-
nings. There are more than 140 000 people working in the game industry in the USA and
Europe alone  Spectrum Strategy Consultants 2002: 20 . The game industry is no longer a
silly toy industry but a global industry. The bad reputation nonetheless still remains.The Pink Machine Papers #16 N
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The game industry’s bad reputation has partially influenced academic research. Only during
the last couple of years computer games have captured the attention of the traditional aca-
demic world  Svedjedal 2003 . Little or almost no research is dedicated to the business or
management aspect of the game industry. This hasn’t stopped researcher from other parts of
the academic world to study the game industry, mainly its social, cultural, psychological,
technological and narrative aspects. While this research has produced very interesting results,
the business and management aspects have been left aside. It is intriguing that much game
research is ignoring the fact that it is often studying companies, products and intriguing eco-
nomic processes and not only “computer games” as such.
The interesting question regarding game industry management research is not why but rather
why not. Should management researchers ignore the game industry only because it is consid-
ered to be “silly”? Why is it more legitimate to study the microelectronics industry than the
game industry when the former is to a large extent powered by the demand created in the
latter? The cause behind most of these opinions is the rationality of seriousness that over-
shadows economic logic. Economic activity according to this logic should be useful, strict and
above all serious  Gustafsson 1994 . Economic research should therefore also be guided by
these principles. Games are the total opposite of this logic. Games are based on play, enter-
tainment and frivolity. This doesn’t, however, change the fact that games are also great busi-
ness. As mentioned above the game industry is already of substantial size and it is growing at
an explosive pace, challenging the size of other much older “entertainment industries” such as
the film and music industries.
Game consoles
Concept
The concept behind game consoles is fairly easy: a device that people can use in their living
rooms to play video games. A console connects the to the TV since this lowers the price  no
extra display device needed . The console is easy to use with no software, driver or hardware
installations. Low pricing of the device attracts many consumers. Many games made by both
the game console manufacturer and third-party game developers create a wide selection of
interesting games. Game console prices are low, but manufacturers charge in contrast gener-
ous margins on the actual games. These economical conditions have led to the development
of the so-called “razor and blades” strategy, where the software subsidizes the price of the
hardware.
Business model
The “razor and blades” metaphor is used due to the similarity to the console industry. The
business model was allegedly invented by the razor manufacturer Gillette. Razors, such as
Gillette Mach3, are sold at loss in order to be subsidized by revenues from high margin razor
blade sales. The razor represents the console and the razor blades the games. The sharpness
of the blades represents the short but intensive popularity of games. Furthermore the meta-The Pink Machine Papers #16 N
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phor also shows that the razor market, i.e. the console market, is not profitable without reve-
nues from the razor blade market, i.e. the game market.
Game genres
Consoles are in a way a compact home version of arcades   providing fast and intensive enter-
tainment. Consequently the usage pattern of game console players is substantially different
from PC players. Game consoles provide short and intensive entertainment with action, sport
and adventure games as most dominant game genres. Puzzle, role and strategy games have
traditionally been absent from the console market.
Technology
Technically speaking game consoles provide sophisticated “cutting edge” technology ex-
tremely adapted to a limited purpose: to play games on a TV. These devices are the size of
small VCRs. They connect to the TV, which is used as a screen but also as a speaker system.
The controller units, which connect to the game consoles with cables and are used to control
and affect the computer game itself, are devices that the players hold with both hands and
contain a relatively high number of buttons, e.g. the Sony Playstation2-controller has 14 but-
tons and 2 mini-joysticks. Games are usually stored on established and standardized storage
media formats such as CD-ROM or DVD-ROM. Hence many game consoles can also be
used as CD or DVD players.
Digital convergence
“Digital convergence” is the business and technology merger of the IT with consumer elec-
tronics industries. Game console are considered to be a vital part of this development, and an
alternative approach to the traditional division between IT and consumer electronics. With
the latest generation of consoles  Sega Dreamcast, Sony Playstaion2, Xbox and Nintendo
GameCube  manufacturers attempted to take part in this development by providing new
 network  technologies. These technologies allow connecting the console to home electron-
ics, external accessories  e.g. keyboard, hard drives, mouse  and networks/broadband. In-
creasingly pervasive attempts by the IT industry  such as Windows CE, Windows Media Edi-
tion, Java, set-top boxes , telecommunication industry  interactive TV services  and the con-
sumer electronics industry to provide “digital hubs”  devices/technologies that control and
connect to various media devices in the home  show the massive support for the vision of theThe Pink Machine Papers #16 N
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digital convergence. However, these inventive attempts have not made any significant inroads
and the vision of convergence is still far off. The latest generation of game consoles did not
become “digital hubs” with Eyetoy  a small camera that plugs into Playstation2 allowing players
to participate “on screen” in different games  and Windows Media Center Extension for Xbox  a
program allowing the Xbox to access media content on a Windows PC  as few exceptions.
Online games
In the current generation of consoles Microsoft  with its Xbox Live service claiming more
than 1 million subscribers  and Sony have the most advanced online strategies. Online games
have the potential to overthrow the entire structure of the game industry, making game dis-
tributors, retailers and possibly publishers unnecessary. What kind of business model will
then be applied: pay-for-play or subscription? What kind of position will telecommunication
companies have in this new model? Despite the promises of online technologies the limited
bandwidth of current network technologies have limited the success of online games. Hence
current generation of console online services serve more as community/multi-player platforms
than distribution platforms.
Console economies
Many products and services heavily on each other and exist in a symbiotic relationship. Mo-
bile phones and cellular networks, cars and petroleum, razors and blades, CD players and CDs
are a couple of popular examples. Not surprisingly the game industry is one of those markets,
where the platform manufacturer is strongly dependent on the game producers and vice versa.
Initially this wasn’t the case   in the beginning Nintendo exclusively created all the games for
its own platform. Theoretically a console manufacturer could maintain this business strategy.
However history has shown that this isn’t a successful way of doing business. Creating good
video games, it turns out, is a completely different business than the production of high-tech
video game consoles. Console manufacturers continue creating games but have turned for
help to independent third-party game developers to provide a wider selection of games.
Games and consoles
The relationship between games and consoles
can be described as a spiral. Good games drive
sales of more consoles, more consoles lead to a
larger market, a large market generates more
game  development  and  more  game  titles,
which lead to more console sales. In this way
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Case: Sega
A negative spiral is a failure for a game console. A famous example of a negative spiral is Sega.
This Japanese company was once a leading manufacturer of consoles, arcades and games.
During the end of 1980’s Sega introduced a console called MegaDrive/Genesis. This console
targeted a slightly older age group with more violent games, which were not available on the
market leading Nintendo NES.   Sega created a “cooler” console that dominated the game
industry for one console generation. Many independent game publisher and developers sup-
ported Sega MegaDrive. Problems arose when Sega decided to introduce hardware upgrades
of MegaDrive called MegaCD and 32X. These upgrades failed in the market since there was
not sufficient interest among game publishers for these modified versions of the MegaDrive.
Weak support by game publishers lead to a smaller selection of games, which negatively influ-
enced sales of MegaDrive consoles and games. The problems continued with Sega’s next con-
sole Saturn that competed with Sony Playstation   a console which totally dominated the
console industry. When Sega finally launched their last console Dreamcast in the end of the
1990’s, publishers and developers had lost faith in the console and Sega.
With low confidence among game publishers and a market impatiently waiting for the Sony
Playstation2, this became the beginning of the end for Sega as console manufacturer. Sega was
loosing substantial amounts on subsidies of the Dreamcast and decided 2000 to phase out the
Dreamcast and close its entire console business, followed by a large reorganization of the
company. What remained was a wide range of good and successful game franchises that had
been created during the years by Sega’s in-house game publisher and developers. These games
were quickly transferred to its former competitor’s consoles from Sony, Nintendo and Micro-
soft. Sega is now one of the world’s largest game publishers and develops many popular game
franchises.
Competing game platforms
The dependence on third-party game developers have caused video game consoles to develop,
similarly to computer operating systems, into platforms   not only technological but also  and
foremost  economic platforms. This has proven to be a very successful business strategy and
has overthrown the PC as the dominant gaming platform and is consistently diminishing the
role of the PC as a commercial gaming platform. In Europe 45% of all games sales are PC
games, but in Japan only 6%  Spectrum Strategy Consultants 2002 . To explain the eco-
nomic rationale of game consoles it is important to know why the PC is decreasing in impor-
tance.
A PC can be combined into almost an infinite number of configurations of both hardware
and software. To be able to play computer games a PC primarily requires special graphics
cards, which are extremely adapted to the specific graphics calculations required by computer
games. Graphics cards are technologically advanced, expensive and are continuously revised
and updated at least every 6 months.The Pink Machine Papers #16 N
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In these fluctuating conditions it is difficult for game developers to adapt their game software
to one specific hardware setup due to the endless number of possible configurations. Game
developers usually then adapt their software to a generic setup, or are forced to make several
versions for different setups. In addition, for many years the PC platform lacked software
tools and industry standards for creating games. Game developer had to “reinvent the wheel”
in software for every new game, increasing the time and cost of game development. Nowadays
there are several industry standards  such as DirectX, OpenGL  and numerous software tools
available, which considerably simplify the process of creating games for the PC platform.
However, in order to keep up with the changing technological environment these software
tools also evolve very quickly.
The rapid development in game hardware and software quickly makes PC games obsolete,
and forces the industry and gamers into a cycle of continuous upgrades. This endless con-
figurability causes instability both for game developers and players. It produces a financial
risk for all parties in the PC game industry, which has caused the failure of the PC as the
leading gaming platform. The PC will of course not completely cease to exist as a commercial
game platform. It will continue as the platform for game fanatics and as a marginal platform
for people with casual interest in games.
Advantages of game consoles
The business concept of the game console is to solve all the above-mentioned disadvantages
of the PC. PCs are technologically complicated, technologically diverse, hard to use, expen-
sive, often unaesthetically design and have low barriers to entry for game developers.
Console manufacturers have hence created devices that are technologically simple, techno-
logically consistent, easy to use, cheap, aesthetically designed and have high barriers to devel-
oper entry.
•  Technologically simple. Game consoles are equally as technologically complicated
as PCs and in many cases even more. Consoles instead try to hide the technology
from the users. The technology in consoles is designed for one purpose: to play
games on a TV. Hence consoles do not require upgrades or advanced settings   they
are designed to be equally as easy to use as a TV.
•  Technologically consistent. Stability in the shape of standards is essential for all
technological development  not only game development , which often is not the case
in the PC industry where almost all standards are the results of a long and confusing
war between competing standards. A game console platform is the total opposite
with a predictable and stable set of standards. This creates a stability that is not
available on the PC platform. It is important to stress that different game consoles
are not compatible and are hence competing standards   but unlike the PC every
console platform is a set of strictly defined hardware and software standards defined
by one manufacturer.The Pink Machine Papers #16 N
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•  Easy to use. The fact that PCs are not perceived as easy to use shouldn’t come as a
surprise for many users. Regardless of the efforts of software engineers, cognitive
psychologists and user interface experts, most users utilize a minimal percentage of a
computer’s possibilities. The rest of the functionality disappears in a tangle of bad
technologies and user interfaces. Personal computers  PCs  are relatively hard to in-
stall, hard to use, and hard to modify. Console manufacturers on the other hand have
made game consoles as easy as possible to use. To install a console one cable is con-
nected to a TV and another to the power outlet. Then the ON/OFF button is
pressed, a CD/DVD  containing the game  inserted and the gaming can begin.
•  Cheap. PCs are relatively expensive. Despite falling prices, due to an extremely
competitive market, the price of a PC is significantly higher than most other game
platforms. To reduce prices manufacturers have created cost-effective game plat-
forms tailored for gaming purposes only. This strategy has not however reduced the
price sufficiently for the target audience  traditionally children and young adults . For
example the production cost of the latest game console Xbox is a well-kept secret,
but according to some sources it is slightly above $300  Takahashi 2002b: 105 .
Therefore console manufacturers choose to reduce the price below the production
cost, i.e. to sell with a loss, to later recoup with revenues from license fees and in-
house games. In this way console manufacturers have managed to lower the selling
price to less than $150  in late 2004 . The goal is to reach a price level within the
range of impulse and gift purchases for the target audience.
•  Aesthetical design. PCs are, according to many, unaesthetically designed clearly
expressing that they are not intended for entertainment. Game consoles from the
1980’s mainly looked like the grey or black home electronics in those days. During
the 1990’s console manufacturers became more daring with some interesting designs,
but grey still dominated. With the last generation of game consoles the manufactur-
ers have attempted to create original designs. Nintendo’s GameCube is shaped like a
cube and is available in many vibrant colours. Nintendo’s designs have always tried to
communicate entertainment and playfulness. Sony began rather unadventurously
with a grey Playstation, but with a totally new type of controllers. Sony’s sequel,
Playstation2, was slightly more adventurous with a black futuristic hi-tech design that
could be placed vertically  as opposed to horizontally as all other game consoles . The
design of the Microsoft Xbox is based on an “X” to allude to the name and the logo-
type. Originally the designers wanted the console in the shape of a big silver-coloured
“X”, but that concept was abandoned due to cost reasons.
•  High barriers to entry. No company or organisation owns or controls the entire
PC platform and hence there are no  economical  barriers to entry. Low entry barri-
ers attract many developers possibly creating an overcrowded market with low qual-
ity games and imitated concepts. This was exactly the case in the beginning of the
1980’s when the game industry crashed due to an oversupply of low quality gamesThe Pink Machine Papers #16 N
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 Herz 1997: 19 . The PC game market today can also be characterized as being over-
supplied. Console manufacturers therefore impose quality requirements on third-
party game developers by increasing the barriers to entry for game developers and
publishers. These barriers are e.g. expensive software development kits, license fees
and quality controls performed by the console manufacturers. Basically console
manufacturers create a “walled garden” where only games of a certain quality level are
allowed to exist.
Business strategies of the console industry
In  order  to  illustrate  the  business  strategies  employed  in  the  game  console  industry  a
chronological description of a game console’s life cycle will be presented.
Development
2 to 4 years prior to a new console introduction and predecessor phase out, the game console
manufacturer initiates hardware and software development for the new game console. Reli-
able industry data is scarce, but according to some sources  Gibson 2002  Sony invested $1.9
billions in development of Playstation2 up to 1999, its launch year. Microsoft is said to have
planned investments between $900 millions and $3.3 billions during the Xbox’s planned life
of 6 years   Takahashi 2002b: 183-184 . Sony in cooperation with IBM and Toshiba is invest-
ing $400 million into development of a next generation graphics chips called “Cell” intended
for the next generation Playstation, projected for release 2005-2006  Spooner 2002 . In other
words development of console hardware is an extremely capital intensive process with colos-
sal entry barriers. In order to maintain its technological competitiveness during the entire life
span console technology must be considerably more sophisticated at introduction compared
to competing technologies in the PC industry and elsewhere, which significantly increases the
development costs. Usually within one to two years the PC competitors catch up and surpass
with superior technology.
As game consoles depend on the availability of a wide variety of good games, which can only
be provided in cooperation with third-party game developers, console manufacturers have to
take into account important game developers’ opinions regarding software and hardware ex-
pectations. Without support among game developers a console is doomed in the market. Co-
operating with the game developer community thus becomes a crucial aspect in the develop-
ment process of a game console.
Case: Xbox development
While console development requires massive investments it is counterbalanced by a clear
ambition to reduce development and production costs since these directly affect the price of
the game console  or rather reduce the size of the subsidy . Consequently game consoles be-
come unconventional combinations of sophisticated  and expensive  technology and cost re-
ducing solutions. Illustrating this trade-off is the case of Xbox.The Pink Machine Papers #16 N
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Microsoft began its venture into the game industry with a software technology called DirectX.
This set of software packages facilitates game development on the PC platform. It also posi-
tioned Microsoft’s operating system Windows as a game platform, which previously had been
more or less ignored by game developers. Microsoft’s technology successfully introduced
greater stability in the technologically volatile market for PC games and became the de facto
software standard for PC game development. DirectX did not however manage to compete
with the explosively successful game consoles such as Playstation. As a response Microsoft
quickly entered the game console industry in order to capture a slice of this increasingly im-
portant market segment. Its console was based on the DirectX technology   hence the name
X-box as in Direct-X. Microsoft’s strategy focused on quickly transferring its leverage, tech-
nology and third-party game developers from the PC to the console, by replicating  or “port-
ing”  the successful DirectX technology to a new hardware platform.
From a technological point of view the DirectX technology requires other hardware and
software technologies such as Microsoft Windows and PC hardware  e.g. CPU, hard drive
and RAM  in order to work properly   basically demanding a complete Windows PC. When
converting the DirectX technology from PC to console Microsoft faced two strategic op-
tions: creating a new cost-effective and proprietary hardware platform  requiring modifica-
tions of the DirectX technology itself , or leaving the DirectX technology intact and adapting
the hardware to a console format. The first alternative would involve large hardware devel-
opment costs. Sony and Nintendo adhere to this strategy and thus possess the competence,
capacity and experience to develop a new hardware platform. Being a software company Mi-
crosoft lacks this competence since it is not in the business of hardware development. Fur-
thermore this option would interfere with the primary objective of transferring leverage from
PC to console, since the DirectX technology would have to be revised. This time-consuming
option would also be unsuitable given that a fast time-to-market was needed.
Microsoft in cooperation with Flextronics instead opted for a solution that could be charac-
terized as a low budget PC. Xbox has an Intel processor, RAM, hard drive, modified version
of Microsoft Windows 2000, and a graphics processor from Nvidia  the leading graphics card
manufacturer in the PC industry . By relying on the unmodified DirectX technology and on
the established PC platform Microsoft reduced the hardware and software development costs
of the Xbox. A similar strategy was used when the DVD standard was chosen as storage me-
dia format   it was cheaper in development and game reproduction costs, and reduced inven-
tory risk for publishers. Seemingly counterintuitively a relatively costly hard drive was in-
cluded. This option on the other hand reduced the development time and avoided modifica-
tions to the DirectX technology. Lower development costs, shorter development process and
DirectX compatibility was prioritized instead of lower production costs, resulting in a slightly
more expensive console.
The case of Xbox shows how factors such as cost reduction, time-to-market, hardware and
software technology issues, and corporate strategy among others dynamically affect the design
and development of game consoles.The Pink Machine Papers #16 N
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Production
Sony managed to sell 980 000 Playstation2 consoles during the first 3 days after the premiere
in Japan 2000  Becker and Fried 2000 . Evidently an efficient production process is required
to satisfy such great demand. According to rumours Sony is said to have invested $1.2 billion
into establishing sufficient fabrication facilities to ensure volume production of Playstation2
and its components. Despite these investments Sony had huge difficulties satisfying demand
when Playstation2 was introduced in the USA and Europe. Microsoft outsourced its entire
production to the outsourcing giant Flextronics, but they also faced production problems.
During the life span the entire console construction and production process is continuously
improved. The strategy is to reduce the production cost in order to minimize the subsidy loss
for every unit, or in the case of a price war with competitors, maintain the subsidy level but
reduce the price.
The table below illustrates the production capacity required to satisfy the demand of the
market.







Source: Microsoft (2004), Nintendo (2004)  and  Sony  (2004)
Annual Reports, DTI
Marketing and sales
Massive marketing campaigns are employed when launching new game consoles. Microsoft’s
marketing budget for the Xbox during its launch year was $500 million  Wong 2001 . Until
the beginning of the 1990’s the industry primarily concentrated on children, but has now re-
focused on an older segment, 18 to 28 year olds. Sony’s innovative marketing strategy in the
middle of the 1990’s targeted, as opposed to earlier consoles, an older age group, which had
been brought up with video games. This pioneering marketing strategy opened up an entire
new  or rather old  market, and turned the Playstation to the most successful  in terms of
number of units sold  console ever.
For every new console generation the size of the market significantly increases. Generally the
market is segmented in two target groups: newcomers and gamers  previous console owners .
Hard-core gamers will buy the console at practically any price, however, the majority of gam-
ers must be persuaded to buy a new console, abandoning the old. Statistics from Sony  2004 
show that on average a Playstation2 owner buys 8 games corresponding to approximatelyThe Pink Machine Papers #16 N
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$400 in console investments. In addition there is the cost of the console itself, $200-$500,
and in many cases accessories for about $100, in total about $1000.
This investment causes a so-called “lock-in” effect  Cf. Shapiro and Varian 1998: 103-171 .
Lock-in effects are desirable for the dominating console by increasing the transition cost to a
competing platform/console. Disadvantageous lock-in effects arise for competing consoles,
but also between new and old generations of consoles from the same manufacturer. In an at-
tempt to reduce negative lock-in effects between Playstation  old generation  to Playstation2
 new generation , Sony introduced the possibility to play old Playstation games on Playsta-
tion2 consoles, creating bridges between the old and new investment.
Technology can reduce lock-in effects but the primary effect is created by the price of the
console. In a situation with fierce competition and low console prices manufacturers utilize
subvention as means of competition. To finance this business strategy console manufacturers
turn to their second revenue source: game sales. A fee is added to the game price in order to
pay off the subsidy. Its size is determined by two factors: subsidy size and subsidy structure.
According to some sources  Takahashi 2002a  the console production costs of a Xbox is sub-
sidized by $150. This subsidy is then divided by the average number of games purchased by
console owners   the so-called tie-ratio. According to Sony  2002  its tie-ratio is 7.9, Xbox has
a tie-ratio of 5.7 and GameCube 5.5. By dividing the size of the subsidy with the tie-ratio a
license fee is calculated. It is applied to every console game sold.
In order to secure the tie-ratio, which in the case of Xbox is around 9  Takahashi 2002b: 185 ,
console manufacturers develop and publish exclusive in-house games on their platforms.
These games provide a competitive advantage, but also ensure faster recoupment since in-
house developed games generate higher margins. Consequently these in-house game titles are
prioritized, and constitute a strategic factor in the subsidy model calculations.
Additional ways to guarantee a good tie-ratio is by arranging exclusive game titles from inde-
pendent third-party game publishers. Exclusive titles are growing in importance in a crowded
console market with increasing difficulties to differentiate consoles and target different mar-
ket segments.
Marketing and PR is not only limited to consumers but also targets third-party game devel-
opers and publishers, since these create, in cooperation with the console manufacturer, the
success of the console. Demonstrations, developer conferences, launch parties,  occasionally 
financial support  free software kits or initial development financing , industry contacts are
provided to market the console with game developers.
Phase out
A console life span is usually about 6 years and depend mainly on technological factors: the
first two years the console is introduced while the last generation is slowly phased out. The
next two years are usually the console’s peak in terms of popularity and sales. Finally the con-The Pink Machine Papers #16 N
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sole goes through a period of declining/saturated sales and finally a transition phase into the
next generation of consoles. During the phase-out production of the console is continued,
and it is often remarketed to poorer markets. The table on page 13 clearly illustrates that 5
years after the introduction of Sony Playstation2 and the phase out of Sony Playstation, the
latter console still is globally by far the most popular console. Simultaneously with the launch
of Playstation2 in 1999 a revised Playstation, called Sony PSone, almost half the size of the
original Playstation was introduced. Approaching its phase-out the Playstation2 has similarly
been reworked to almost half its previous size.
Discussion
In the previous chapters, by describing the characteristics of game consoles and their life cy-
cles, the console economy has been explained. The analysis clearly illuminates that the game
console industry is not solely a hardware business, but primarily a set of connected markets
and businesses. As mentioned previously this “console economy” usually is illustrated by the
“razor and blades” metaphor. This metaphor effectively represents many similarities between
razor and game industries. Unfortunately it does not sufficiently reflect many important as-
pects of the console industry, such as the complex technological/economic balance and the
dependence on third-party game developers.
A more fitting way to depict these features is proposed, namely to view the console/game
market as a medieval marketplace. In this metaphor a thick wall surrounds the marketplace.
Salesmen have to enter through a gate and pay a substantial entry fee to be able open their
market stalls. Buyers on the other hand must pay a relatively low entrance fee. For each sold
item the salesman pays taxes to the patron who owns the marketplace. Buyers can find a wide
selection of goods, salesmen can increase their sales, and the patron generates revenues from
entrance fees, taxes and sales from his/her own in-house salesmen. The patron depends on
foreign salesmen since they provide exotic goods not available in the region.
The patron is interested in maximizing the marketplace profit. A price war with a neigh-
bouring marketplace has reduced entrance fees to a level where they can no longer cover the
wall construction expenses. The patron must now decide the following factors: investment in
wall construction, size of entrance fees, size of taxes, how to attract salesmen and buyers, and
finally how many in-house salesmen to employ.
To balance all these factors in order to maximize long-term  until the next marketplace has to
be built  profit is a balance act similar to the console industry. The building of a marketplace
wall represents the development and production costs of game consoles. Buyer entrance fees
represent the console price. Entrance fees for salesmen correspond to the cost of software
development kits and quality control fees. Taxes, by far the largest revenue source, relate to
the  tie-ratio  license fees. The patron’s in-house salesmen are equivalent to the in-house
game developers of console manufacturers. Marketplace goods of course represent games ti-
tles. Balancing all the above-mentioned factors is similar to the situation of a console manu-
facturer when a new console has to be launched.The Pink Machine Papers #16 N
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If the patron builds a smaller marketplace the initial investment risk will be lower. The re-
sulting low entrance fee may attract more buyers. However, a too small marketplace can dis-
please salesmen. Too expensive of a market wall may impress, but entrance fees and taxes may
become too steep and fend off both salesmen and buyers. Consequently the patron must pre-
dict the number of buyers and adapt its size and cost accordingly. The patron has also discov-
ered that in-house salesmen with attractive goods generate more revenues, thus improving
profits and attracting buyers. Too many in-house salesmen might however upset independent
salesmen. It is imperative to advertise the marketplace in surrounding villages where the ma-
jority of buyers live. Good relationships with independent salesmen are crucial since they
generate the majority of revenues.
The marketplace metaphor shows to a larger extent, than the “razor and blades” metaphor,
how many factors that have to be balanced and their interdependence. The metaphor stresses
that consoles are small economies where the market strategy and structure affect the dynam-
ics and development of these economies.
Conclusions
This paper has shown how game consoles, using a “razor and blades” business model derived
from the symbiotic relationship between consoles and games, have successfully managed to
conquer the game industry, by resolving the technological and economical instability inherent
in the PC game platform. Furthermore, a life cycle analysis, have exposed that game consoles
constitute “console economies” that rely on a complex balance between aspects such as con-
sole development costs, production capacity, marketing costs, console price, subsidy size, tie-
in ratio, license fees, in-house game development, and relationships with third-party game
developers. As a way to understand this dynamic set of factors and their interrelationship, aThe Pink Machine Papers #16 N
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new metaphor is proposed: the medieval marketplace. This metaphor better highlights the
complex technological/economic balance and the dependence on third-party game developers
that create the console economies.
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news.com.com/2100-1040-243763.html?legacy=cnet. Accessed 2001-07-27Pink Machine is the name of a research project currently carried out at the Department of
Industrial Economics and Management at the Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm. It aims
to study the often forgotten non-serious driving forces of technical and economical development.
We live indeed in the reality of the artificial, one in which technology has created, constructed
and reshaped almost everything that surrounds us. If we look around us in the modern world, we
see  that  it  consists  of  things,  of artefacts. Even  the  immaterial  is formed  and created by
technology - driven by the imperative of the economic rationale.
As  Lev  Vygotsky  and  Susanne  Langer  have  pointed  out,  all  things  around  us,  all  these
technological wonders, have their first origin in someone’s fantasies, dreams, hallucinations and
visions. These things, which through their demand govern local and global economical processes,
have little to do with what we usually regard as “basic human needs”. It is rather so, it could be
argued, that the economy  at large is governed by human’s unbounded thirst for jewellery, toys
and entertainment. For some reason - the inherent urge of science for being taken seriously,
maybe - these aspects have been recognised only in a very limited way within technological and
economical research.
The seriousness of science is grey, Goethe said, whereas the colour of life glows green. We want
to bring forward yet another colour, that of frivolity, and it is pink.
The Pink Machine Papers is our attempt to widen the perspective a bit, to give science a streak of
pink. We would like to create a forum for half-finished scientific reports, of philosophical guesses
and drafts. We want thus to conduct a dialogue which is based on current research and which
gives us the opportunity to present our scientific ideas before we develop them into concluding
and rigid - grey - reports and theses.
Finally: the name “Pink Machine” comes from an interview carried out in connection with heavy
industrial constructions, where the buyer of a diesel power plant worth several hundred million
dollars confessed that he would have preferred his machines to be pink.
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